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Open or Closed:
Balancing Border Policy with Human Rights
Elizabeth M. Bruch'
"We are living in a time when civil rights, meaning basic human rights, are
being reformulated, redefined, and extended to new categories of people."
Roger Nett (1971)
"We should not be afraid of open borders."
Bill Ong Hing (2006)
3
INTRODUCTION
O PEN borders have not been a popular idea in the United States for
at least a century.4 Since the federal government became involved
in immigration regulation in the late 1800s, the history of immigration
policy has generally been one of increasing restrictions and limitations.5
I Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law; Visiting Scholar,
Centre for Feminist Legal Studies, Law Faculty, University of British Columbia. I am grate-
ful to the Potomac Valley Writers Workshop for valuable review and critique of a draft of this
article at the winter meeting, and especially to Johanna Bond and Margaret Johnson, and my
colleague Jeremy Telman. I am also indebted to Dave Gage for his support and encourage-
ment, to Marc Sanchez for research assistance, and to the students in my immigration law
courses at Valparaiso University School of Law and Notre Dame Law School for their many
thoughtful questions and comments over the past several years on issues related to borders,
immigration and citizenship.
z Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People on
the Face of the Earth, 8I ETHICS 212 (1971).
3 Closing Remarks of Professor Bill Ong Hing, Transcript, Hastings Race and Poverty Law
Journal Third Annual Symposium: Economic Justice; Growing Inequality in America, 3 HASTINGS
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 141, 157 (2006).
4 However, they were essential to the early development of the nation. I CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
2.02[] (2004). The first general federal immigration law was adopted in 1882. Id. § 2.02[21
(imposing a head tax and excluding "idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to become
a public charge").
5 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at §§ 2.02-2.04 (tracing the histo-
ry of immigration legislation in the U.S.). The most noted exception to this trend is the
Immigration Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. ioi-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). However, the two major
immigration laws of 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), returned to the
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As is true for many issues in immigration law, the debate on borders has
shifted even more dramatically in the years since the attacks of September
11, 2001. The national agenda on immigration has been focused on
increased enforcement, tightening or strengthening the borders, and, in
some cases, restricting immigration. In fact, the only immigration-related
accomplishment of the last Congress was a bill authorizing a 700-mile
fence along the U.S.-Mexico border.6 Although the project has not been
adequately funded and many think it will never be built, the bill illustrates,
at least, the level of political debate on the border in the United States.
In light of the well-known historical failure and repudiation of fences
and walls between nations, this suggests a new low point in the national
policy discussion.7 The current Congress may not do much better. At this
writing, Congress has essentially abandoned consideration of a proposed
comprehensive immigration reform bill.' A selection of immigration bills of
smaller scope are being discussed, but the overall tenor of the immigration
debate remains centered on restriction and enforcement.
Notwithstanding this trend in law and policy towards closing the
borders, many Americans are more conflicted and nuanced in their views on
restrictionist trend, as have subsequent legislative efforts. See Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, iIO Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-2o8, i io Stat. 3009-546(1996) (codi-
fied in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 1o9-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006) (authorizing
700-mile fence to "establish operational control over the international land and maritime bor-
ders of the United States").
7 See Daniel Benjamin, Wall of Shame 1961-1989, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989 at 42, available at
http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/berlin/wall.html (describing the deaths and separa-
tion of families caused by and the symbolic significance of the Berlin Wall); Nett, supra note
2, at 224 ("building walls is a peculiarly lonely job and an admission of the inadequacy of the
system").
8 See S. 1348, 1 ioth Cong. (2007) (A bill to provide for "comprehensive immigration re-
form and for other purposes"). At the time it was introduced to much fanfare, Senator Richard
J. Durbin of Illinois said: "'This bill is drawing opposition from business, labor, Democrats,
Republicans, theists and nontheists, American League and National League baseball fans.
What I'm trying to say to you is there's more opposition to this bill than support. The force
behind this compromise is the understanding that if we fail, the process ends probably for the
next two years."' Robert Pear and Michael Luo, Senate Votes, 64-31, to Retain Temporary Worker
Program in Immigration Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 2o. Despite claims that the draft
legislation represented a "'grand bargain' addressing a broad range of immigration concerns,
it reflected a troubling emphasis on restriction and enforcement. Id. The proposed legisla-
tion included: additional enforcement provisions (border enforcement and interior enforce-
ment, including increased workplace enforcement); a temporary worker program (with limits
on time period and caps on total numbers); reallocation of permanent resident visas (fewer
family-based and more employment-based for professional and other skilled workers); and a
long-term path to citizenship for some undocumented persons currently in the United States
(after payment of fines and penalties, a waiting period and other qualifications). S. 1348, 1 ioth
Cong. (2007). See also AILA InfoNet, Doc. No. 07051768 (posted May 17, 2007), Summary of
Senate "Grand Bargain," http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=ioi91671218846122365.
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immigration, recognizing the potential advantages as well as the potential
disadvantages.9 I see this conflict reflected in my immigration law course
each semester. I begin the course by taking an informal poll of students'
views. I ask them to place themselves on the spectrum of immigration
policy, choosing from closed borders (no immigration), to more restrictions
on immigration, to the current levels of (and policy toward) immigration, to
fewer restrictions on immigration, or open borders (unfettered immigration).
Students spread across that spectrum, but the most interesting answers
are at either end. I have yet to have a student advocate for completely
closed borders, but every year a few students vote for completely open
borders. Why then does national policy give so little consideration to this
perspective?
This article considers the role of borders in U.S. immigration law and
the influence of international law in shaping that role. The international
law doctrine of sovereignty, with the related concepts of territorial integrity
and national autonomy, has served as a foundational concept for a U.S.
immigration policy that favors restrictions on immigration-"closing" the
borders. However, an evolved understanding of the role of sovereignty
in international law, and in particular its relationship to human rights, also
offers the possibility of a radical reevaluation of immigration policy that
would remove many of the current limitations on immigration-"opening"
the borders. 10 This article contends that U.S. policy is out of balance when it
9 A recent New York Times/CBS Poll suggests that two-thirds of Americans favor both a
guest-worker program and a path to citizenship for those "with [a] good employment history
and no criminal record" currently present in the U.S. without authorization. Julia Preston and
Marjorie Connelly, Immigration Bill Provisions Gain Wide Support in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2007, at i. Interestingly, the article also notes that almost one-half of the poll respondents fa-
vor some controls on immigration, with the remaining respondents equally divided in favor of
either completely open borders or completely closed borders. Id. ("These polarized positions
may help explain the acrimony of the immigration debate across the nation") See also Most
Americans Favor Guest-Worker Program: Poll, REUTERS, Nov. 22, 2oo6, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN213879862oo6I122 (reporting nationwide poll by
Quinnipiac University, which found that most Americans believe that unauthorized immi-
grants should be allowed to work and eventually become citizens, yet a majority also believe
Congress should do more to address unauthorized entry). Even in the border states, such as
Texas, there is a range of views: "'Our opinions were kind of left out .... Here we are in the
midst of an economic mega-boom and we're building fences .... What ridiculous symbolism.
Here we are tearing walls down around the world and we're putting up walls [in the U.S.]"'
See Lynn Brezosky, Border Texans See Holes in Fence Proposal, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 26, 2oo6,
available at http://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/apholesio-z6-o6.htm (quoting Laredo
Mayor Raul Salinas).
io Although the voices in support of open borders are relatively few, they are eloquent.
Professor Kevin Johnson has written the most recent and comprehensive argument in support
of open borders. Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003) (discussing
the moral, economic and policy arguments in support of open borders). A recent report of the
Global Commission on International Migration also cogently summarizes important arguments
in support of migration without borders. Antoine P6coud and Paul de Guchteneire, Migration
2007- 2oo8 ]
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over-emphasizes restrictions on immigration-"closed" borders-without
considering countervailing policy goals and values that would encourage
fewer restrictions-"open" borders. It aspires to reinvigorate and redirect
the public conversation in this area by drawing upon international human
rights law to encourage a more expansive consideration of the spectrum of
options-from "closed" to "open"-for our borders.
Part I of this article discusses the historical justifications, grounded
in international law, in support of closed borders in the U.S.; it also
illustrates how current immigration law gives prominence to this restrictive
approach.11 The article then examines in Part II arguments in support of
open borders, grounded in a modern understanding of international law,
including international human rights law." It suggests how such a revised
approach might be reflected in U.S. immigration law. Finally, the article
concludes that the present emphasis in the U.S. on closing the borders is
inconsistent with the expansion of human rights and may ultimately be
ineffective in countering the economic, cultural and security concerns that
underlie a restrictionist approach to the borders.13
I. CLOSED BORDERS: SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND SELECTIVITY
Although it is rarely framed this way in discussions of U.S. immigration
law, U.S. borders and U.S. sovereignty within those borders are a function
of international law as much as-or more than-domestic law. The U.S.
Supreme Court relied on the international law doctrine of sovereignty in
one of the foundational cases of immigration law, Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (the Chinese Exclusion Case) in 1889. 1 In that case, the Court articulated
an expansive view of national sovereignty, based on international law, to
justify federal regulation of immigration matters: sovereignty empowers
a nation both to select who it will include as citizen-member or guest and
to exclude those it deems to be a threat or otherwise undesirable. 5 The
Court has reaffirmed that expansive view of sovereign power repeatedly
in subsequent years.16 The Court's sovereignty-based approach laid the
without Borders: An Investigation into the Free Movement of People, 27 GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSP.
I (April zoo5) available at http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%zoNo%z027.pdf. Roger
Nett started this discussion over 35 years ago. See Nett, supra note 2, at 212. My interest in
and thoughts on this issue have been greatly influenced by these writers.
I i See infra notes 14-77 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 78-i6o and accompanying text.
13 See infra conclusion.
14 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
15 Id. at 604-05 (affirming that "the United States, in their relation to foreign countries
and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to indepen-
dent nations" and listing a range of related "sovereign" powers).
16 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 717 (zooI) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (character-
izing detention decision in the context of removal as a "sovereign power"); Miller v. Albright,
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foundation for "plenary" federal power in the area of immigration, and that
sovereignty-based approach has been used-and continues to be used-to
justify any subsequent efforts to limit, restrict or eliminate immigration. 7
A. International Law Support for Closed Borders
The sovereignty of nation-states forms a bedrock principle of public
international law."8 Its theoretical ascendancy occurred in the 1800s, and
it was particularly current during the era of the Chinese Exclusion Case.19
It is integrally related both to principles of autonomy and to the idea of
territorial integrity.2 0 As a matter of international law, the essential aspects
523 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1998) (relying on Fiallo); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (cit-
ing earlier decisions and noting that "[olur recent decisions have not departed from this
long-established rule"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765-66 (1972) (citing the Chinese
Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting v. United States and noting that "the Court's general reaffir-
mations of this principle have been legion"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88
(1952) ("That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion after long residence is a practice that
bristles with severities. But it is a weapon of defense and reprisal confirmed by international
law as a power inherent in every sovereign state"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 711 (1893) ("[tlhe right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely
or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare");
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 65i, 659 (1892) ("every sovereign nation has the power, as
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners
within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe").
17 There is a vast body of legal scholarship on the concept of the federal "plenary pow-
er" in immigration and debate on its continuing vitality. Some recent examples include: T
Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis,
i6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Is there a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); Johnson, supra note Io, at 289; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is there a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307
(2000); Victor C. Romero, On Elian andAliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem,
4 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 343 (2001); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power,
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002).
18 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (5th ed. 1999) ("The
sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a uniform legal
personality"). See id. at Io6 ("The normal complement of state rights, the typical case of
legal competence, is described commonly as 'sovereignty'...."). John Boli, Sovereignty from
a World Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL
POSSIBILITIES 53 (Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) ("it is hardly too much
to say that it constitutes a core element in the very definition of the state").
19 BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 126 (describing historical changes in concepts of law, in-
cluding sovereignty); see Satvinder S. Juss, Free Movement and World Order, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 289, 297-302 (2004) (describing the evolving relationship between sovereignty and migra-
tion).
20 BROWNLIE, supra note I8, at 105-o6 ("The state territory.., together with the govern-
2oo7-2oo8]
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of national sovereignty include equality and equal relations between states
and the autonomy to consent (or not) to relationships and obligations among
states."' Fundamentally, the idea of national sovereignty is the power to
exercise authority over the individuals living within the territory of the
state and to act on behalf of those citizen-members of the state."2 However,
in addition to these powers to act affirmatively toward and on behalf of its
own population, sovereignty also empowers a state to exclude other states
-and by extension, the populations of other states-to prevent them from
intruding upon or interfering with the territorial integrity of the state. 3
Despite the historical links between national sovereignty and the powers
to include and exclude, the United States government did not initially
assert much control in the area of immigration. For the first century of its
existence, the United States allowed immigration matters to be addressed
primarily by the individual states.2 4 However, in 1889, that shifted abruptly
with the Supreme Court's decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case."5 In
that case, the Court determined that the power to regulate immigration
was vested in the federal government.2 6 The Court did not reach that
conclusion by relying on any express constitutional power or provision. 7
ment and population within its frontiers, comprise the physical and social manifestations of
the primary type of international legal person, the state"); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 87 (2001) (noting the centrality of sovereign equality, together with other principles, such
as the ban on intervention in the affairs of other states, equal rights and self-determination
of peoples).
21 BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 289 ("sovereignty is in a major aspect a relation to other
states (and to organizations of states) defined by law"). CASsEsE, supra note 2o, at 88-91 (de-
scribing the distinct but related notions of sovereignty and legal equality). These principles
are also reflected in the U.N. Charter, article 2. 1, which states: "The Organization is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. Charter art. 2, para. I.
22 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 89. See BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 289-9o. In particular,
nation-states have historically been considered "exclusively in control of nationality mat-
ters." Id. at 385-86.
23 CASSESE, supra note Zo, at 89. Other characteristics of sovereignty include various im-
munities for state actions and state officials, as well as respect for state nationals, officials and
property abroad. Id. at 9o.
24 The main exception was the short-lived and controversial Alien Act of 1789 (part of
the Alien and Sedition laws). GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHIR, supra note 4, at § 2.02[1]
(2004). The text of "An Act Respecting Alien Enemies," 6th Cong., (1798), is available through
the Avalon Project at Yale Law School at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/alien.
htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
25 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exdusion Case), 130 U.S. 58i, 603 (1889).
z6 Id. ("That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open
to controversy").
27 The Court alludes to general powers conferred on the federal government under the
Constitution, such as the war power and other foreign relations powers, but does not cite any
specific Constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court characterizes these as "sovereign" pow-
ers. Id. at 604.
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Rather, the Court reached that conclusion by reasoning that the power to
exclude noncitizens is embedded within the power of a nation to control its
own territory-a power that is inherent to all sovereign states.3s The Court
simply asserted that the nature of sovereignty, an undisputed attribute of
nation-states, required the power to exclude:
[T]he United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects
or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent
nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its
absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. The
powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion,
regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States,
and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers,
restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations
of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all
civilized nations.
2 9
However, the Court buttressed that conclusion by enumerating other
inherent and express powers of the federal government, such as the war
powers, and linking the power to exclude to concerns of national security
and cultural threat (though framed in the language of race-and racism)
that seem familiar today:
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression
and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these
ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters
not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from
the foreign nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of
its people crowding in upon us .... If, therefore, the government of the
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us,
to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which
the foreigners are subjects.
30
The Court reasoned that without the absolute power to exclude, the state
would be subject to the control of another state-the state whose nationals
it could not exclude.
31
28 Id. at 603-04. Even in this expansive characterization of sovereignty, there is some
suggestion of limits based on "considerations of public policy and justice." Id. at 604.
29 Id. The Court stated, "[t]hat the government of the United States, through the action
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do
not think is open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident
of every independent nation." Id. at 603.
30 Id. at 606.
31 Id. at 6o4.
2oo7-zoo8]
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Although the Chinese Exclusion Case was the first decision to ground the
power to exclude in the inherent powers of sovereignty recognized as a
matter of international law, this reasoning was reiterated by the Court in
subsequent cases. In Ekiu v. United States, the Court stated:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation,
to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.3
Also, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court quoted at some length the
international law scholars Vattel33 and Ortolan34 to support the "inherent and
inalienable right" of a sovereign nation to exclude or expel noncitizens."
The domestic consequences of sovereignty in terms of the government's
ability to exclude noncitizens have not been seriously reevaluated in the
32 Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 , 659 (1892) (deciding that noncitizens do not have
due process rights in exclusion proceedings).
33 The Court quoted Vattel as stating:
'Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the coun-
try, when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger,
or doing it a manifest injury. What it owes to itself, the care of its own
safety, gives it this right; and, in virtue of its natural liberty, it belongs
to the nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify
the admission of the foreigner.' 'Thus, also, it has a right to send them
elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners
of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion
any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right,
and is even obliged, in this respect, to follow the rules which prudence
dictates.' [sic]
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-708 (citing Vatt. Law Nat. lib. i, c. 19, §§
230, 231).
34 The Court quoted Ortolan as follows:
The government of each state has always the right to compel foreigners
who are found within its territory to go away, by having them taken to
the frontier. This right is based on the fact that, the foreigner not mak-
ing part of the nation, his individual reception into the territory is matter
of pure permission, of simple tolerance, and creates no obligation. The
exercise of this right may be subjected, doubtless, to certain forms by
the domestic laws of each country; but the right exists none the less,
universally recognized and put in force. In France no special form is
now prescribed in this matter; the exercise of this right of expulsion is
wholly left to the executive power.' [sic]
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 708 (citing Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, (4th Ed.) lib. 2, c. 14, p.
297) (original in French)).
35 Id. (quoting other international law scholars as well). See cases cited supra note 16 as
more recent examples of the Court's reliance on international law and the inherent powers of
sovereignty to justify immigration restrictions.
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United States since these early decisions even though the international
meaning and understanding of sovereignty has evolved significantly since
the 1880s and with greater rapidity within the last decades.3 6 The Supreme
Court continues to defer to the political branches' "plenary power" in
the area of immigration, particularly the inherent and absolute power to
exclude as a function of sovereignty.37 As in the Chinese Exclusion Case and
other early cases, the rationale for such a sweeping view of sovereignty is
often, expressly or implicitly, related to concerns about national security or
the cultural or economic impact of immigration.
B. Closing the Borders in Current U.S. Immigration Law
Current U.S. immigration law and policy also continue to reflect this
sweeping view of sovereignty and the absolute power to exclude. The
resulting "closure" of the borders is evident in various strands of the
national approach to immigration: from limits on lawful immigration and
naturalization,38 to increased border enforcement efforts,39 to physical
obstacles,' to the current popularity of border vigilantism. 41 Unsurprisingly,
the arguments in favor of closed borders have been closely linked to
national sovereignty, and they have spanned a familiar range of concerns
about threats to national security, detrimental economic impact or cultural
change, and general apprehension about opening the "floodgates.
42
36 See cases cited supra note 16.
37 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 717 (zoo I) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing earlier decisions for the description
of "the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute").
38 Limits on lawful immigration are set forth primarily in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (zooo) [hereinafter INA]. See infra notes 40-46, 50-52 and accompanying
text.
39 Enforcement of the national borders is primarily entrusted to the Customs and Border
Patrol, a subdivision of the Department of Homeland Security. i Immigration Law Service
zd § 1:132. The Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling over 7,000 miles of land border
and over 2,000 miles of coastal waters. Id. Other subdivisions within the Department of
Homeland Security and other agencies are also involved in some aspects of border enforce-
ment. Id. § 1:I28.
40 Physical obstacles include fencing, border patrols, and a range of technologies. See
infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
41 The Minuteman Project is perhaps the most well-known, but there are others as
well. See The Minuteman Project, http://www.minutemanproject.com/. Other groups include
Ranch Rescue USA and American Border Patrol. See also, Charlie LeDuff, Illegal Immigrants
File Suit Against Vigilante Patrols, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A2o; infra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
42 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the arguments made today are similar to those anticipated
by Roger Nett in 1971 in his consideration of a right to free movement. Nett, supra note 2,
at 223 ("Where migration is not allowed, it is usually in the name of national security or else
based on the claim that there is no place for the immigrants or no prospect for their gainful
employment").
2007-2008]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Even a relatively cursory examination of current U.S. immigration law
reflects this perspective. As an initial matter, immigration to this country
is not unlimited, either in terms of raw numbers or in terms of the types of
immigration available.43 There is an annual cap of approximately 675,000
persons who may immigrate to the United States, and within that cap
there are further limits by country.44 In addition, prospective immigrants
must fit into one of the available categories of immigration; it is not
enough simply to want to immigrate to the United States. Congress has
established affirmative categories of persons who may immigrate and has
set preferences within those categories. 45 In general terms, the categories
comprise immediate relatives, family-sponsored, employment-based,
diversity or refugee immigration. 46  The categories represent policy
judgments about who is desirable (or, at least, acceptable) as an immigrant.
Without a family connection, particular employment skills, a claim of
persecution, or the good luck to prevail in the diversity lottery, an aspiring
immigrant is without options.
Immigration into the U.S. is a two-step process: potential immigrants
must affirmatively fit into one of the eligible categories, but they must also
avoid being eliminated based on one of the many grounds of inadmissibility.
47
43 The first federal law limiting immigration was passed in 1875 barring "convicts and
prostitutes." GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at § 2.02. Since that time, both
quantitative limits-numerical limits-and qualitative limits-limits on the types of individ-
uals who may immigrate-have been added to the immigration laws. The general pattern has
been to expand, rather than contract, those limitations. See supra note 4.
44 INA, 8 U.S.C. § I 151(c)-(e) (2000) (setting forth the annual limits for family-spon-
sored, employment-based and diversity immigrants); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1 152 (2000) (discussing
per country numerical limitations). The provisions set for the calculations, including ceilings
and in some cases floors; the actual numbers vary from year to year. For example, the annual
Yearbook of Immigration Statistics lists the following numbers of persons obtaining Lawful
Permanent Residence in recent years: 1,122,373 in FY 2005; 957,883 in FY 2004; 703,542
in FY 2003; 1,059,356 in FY 2002; and 1,058,902 in FY 2001. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 5, Table I, available at, http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2oo5/OIS-2005_Yearbook.pdf [hereinafter 2005
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. Moreover, these provisions relate only to permanent
immigration, as opposed to nonimmigrant entries, such as students and visitors, which are
temporary in nature and involve much higher numbers.
45 INA, 8 U.S.C. § 153(a)-(c) (2000) ((a) listing family-sponsored preference categories,
(b) listing employment-based preference categories, and (c) describing diversity preference).
See also 8 U.S.C. § I I51(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000) (exempting immediate relatives from the numerical
limitations); 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000) (regarding annual admissions of refugees).
46 8 U.S.C. § 1151. If a prospective immigrant does not fit within one of the eligible
categories, he or she is ineligible to enter the United States as an immigrant, regardless of
other merit or interest. Those who seek to enter the United States are presumed to be im-
migrants-rather than non-immigrants-unless they can prove otherwise. See 8 U.S.C. §
SIoI(a)(i5) (2000) (defining an "immigrant" as any noncitizen who does not fit within one
of the specified categories of "nonimmigrant aliens"); 8 U.S.C § 1 184(b) (2000) (noncitizen is
presumed to be an immigrant unless he or she can establish otherwise).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000) (setting forth the categories of excludable noncitizens). The
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The Immigration and Nationality Act includes ten general categories of
inadmissibility, including a catch-all miscellaneous category, each with
numerous sub-parts.48 Much like the affirmative categories, these negative
prohibitions also reflect judgments as to who should be allowed into the
country as an immigrant.49 For example, a person "likely to become a public
charge" is inadmissible, as are persons with certain mental and physical
disorders."0 In spite of desirable characteristics such as a family connection
or a valuable employment skill, a potential immigrant who falls within one
of the inadmissibility grounds will not be permitted to immigrate.
In addition to these hurdles, there are further constraints on immigrants
while they are present in the United States, most notably the ongoing risk
of removal" and the limits on the ability of immigrants to naturalize to
citizenship."2 The affirmative and negative limits on immigration, together
with the complexity of the laws and procedures involved, serve to close the
borders and restrict the flow of immigration. 3 The rationales for many of
these limits reflect selectivity in the decision to include-policy choices
grounds of exclusion include health-related grounds, crime-related grounds, security-related
grounds, economic grounds (e.g., the likelihood that a noncitizen will become a public charge,
and the labor certification process that is designed to protect U.S. workers), immigration con-
trol grounds, and miscellaneous other grounds.
48 The grounds of inadmissibility are set forth in the INA, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a) (2ooo) and
its various sub-sections.
49 It is typically easier to enter the United States as a nonimmigrant than as an immi-
grant. In 2005, approximately 175 million noncitizens were admitted as nonimmigrants to the
United States. See ELIZABETH M. GRIECO, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL FLOW
REPORT (2005), TEMPORARY ADMISSIONS OF NONIMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at
I, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/2oo5-Nl-rpt.pdf. In
comparison, the number of immigrants admitted for 2005 was just over l.I million. See 2005
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 5, Table I.
50 See 8 U.S.C. § I I82(a)(4) (excluding any noncitizen "likely at any time to become a
public charge"); Id. § 1 182(a)(i) (excluding noncitizens with particular diseases or with physi-
cal or mental disorders that may threaten the property, safety or welfare of themselves or
others).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2ooo) (setting forth the categories of deportable noncitizens). The
grounds for removal parallel in many respects the grounds of exclusion and encompass con-
duct both within and outside the United States. They include grounds related to violations
of the immigration laws, criminal offenses, documentary fraud, national security, likelihood of
becoming a public charge, and unlawful voting. Id. For many grounds, there is no limitations
period, and an immigrant can be deported at any time-even decades later-after the relevant
violation or offense. See, e.g., Id. § I 227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (a noncitizen "convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable").
52 See INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423-27 (2000) (stating requirements for naturalization and
grounds for prohibiting naturalization). The requirements include both affirmative require-
ments, such as having an understanding of the English language and knowledge of history and
civics, and negative requirements, such as the prohibition on membership in the Communist
Party or any other totalitarian party. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423-24.
53 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 154, 1186(a) (for a statutory overview of the complex procedures
for obtaining immigrant status based on marriage and family relationships).
2007-2008]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
about desirable and undesirable immigrants-and also concerns about
national security-and other explicit and implicit threats-in the decision
to exclude.
Similarly, and more obviously, increased border enforcement efforts
reflect a desire to close the borders to immigration, particularly to
unauthorized or irregular immigration.14 Potential immigrants who do not
fit within one of the designated categories are turned away.5 Immigrants
who are present in the United States without authorization are subject to
"removal" or even "expedited removal. 5 s6 Immigrants who have violated
immigration law in the past are subject to additional bars on admission
or reentry in the future, sometimes indefinitely.57 In addition, tremendous
financial and personnel resources are devoted to staffing the borders and
enforcing the immigration laws, 8 explicit efforts to restrict the flow of
immigration and tighten the borders.59
54 Although "illegal aliens" and "illegal immigration" are common terms in public
discourse, they have developed needlessly pejorative connotations. This article will instead
use the alternative terms of "unauthorized immigration" or "irregular immigration."
55 The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Immigration Statistics provides
relevant enforcement numbers for "apprehensions, investigations, detention and removal"
annually. 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS supra note 44, at I; see id. at 91-124
(providing statistics for 2005); see also MARY DOUGHERTY, DENISE WILSON, & AMY Wu, OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2005 1-5 (2006), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbookl2oo5/Enforcement-AR-.5pdf.
56 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000) (describing removal process); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1228
(describing expedited removal). In 2005, there were "2o8,521 noncitizens formally removed
from the United States[;]" of those, 35 percent, or 72,911, were removed through the expe-
dited removal process. DOUGHERTY ET AL., supra note 55, at I.
57 Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act sets forth numerous bars on
re-entry for those who have violated the immigration laws. For example, failure to appear
for removal hearing without reasonable cause renders a noncitizen inadmissible for 5 years. 8
U.S.C. § I I82(a)(6)(B) (2000). If a noncitizen is ordered removed, he or she becomes inadmis-
sible for either 5 or 1o years from date of removal, depending on when proceedings are initi-
ated. The bar on reentry goes up to 20 years after a second or subsequent removal, and it is
permanent in case of removal based on an "aggravated felony." Id. § 11 82(a)(9)(A). There are
also bars on reentry after periods of "unlawful presence" in the U.S. See id. § 1 182(a)(9)(B).
58 The U.S. Customs and Border Protection states that on a "typical day" in 2006, it
employed 42,000 employees (including I8,ooo officers and 12,3oo Border Patrol agents);
processed i.I million persons (including 68o,ooo noncitizens); executed over 3,ooo arrests
and apprehensions; and refused entry to over 6oo persons. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, "ON A TYPICAL DAY" FACT SHEET at 1 (2007), available at http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/cbp-overview/rypical-day.cttltypical-day.pdf (listing
various statistics). The President's proposed budget for Customs and Border Protection for FY
2007 is approximately $8 billion. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP BUDGET IN
BRIEF (2007), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgovltoolbox/aboutlaccomplish/ (posted Aug.
6, 2007); see also 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 91-124, Tables
34-42 (describing enforcement actions).
59 See Ask the White House, Comments of Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland
Security, (Nov. 30, 2005), availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/aSk/20051 13o.html ("Gaining
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Finally, in recent years, the effort to close the borders has expanded to
include both physical obstacles and popular participation in "enforcement"
efforts. Approximately 14 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border are now fenced,
and recent legislation has called for an additional 700 miles of fencing.' In
addition to the actual physical fencing, there are more border patrol officers
and a wide range of monitoring technology, such as automatic drones and
motion detectors.6 ' Despite the many increased efforts to patrol the borders,
there remains such a level of frustration by some members of the public
at the limits of enforcement that grassroots organizations, most notably
the Minutemen, 6 have sprung up to "assist" with. government efforts to
enforce the borders.
The arguments in favor of closed borders and in support of measures to
effectuate them have been closely linked to the original notion of sovereignty
reflected in the Chinese Exclusion Case. Moreover, these arguments feature a
similar range of concerns-from national security worries to anxiety about
the economic and cultural impact of immigrants and an overarching fear
that the nation will be overwhelmed if the immigration "floodgates" are
opened.63 The concern about national security is most obviously linked
full control of our borders is a priority for the Department of Homeland Security.... It is not
practical to believe that we can seal our border entirely, but we can create such a high likeli-
hood of interdiction that it will create an unequivocal deterrent effect on those who wish to
cross illegally").
6o Secure Fence Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. IO9-367 (enacted Oct. 26, zoo6) (authorizing
700-mile fence to "establish operational control over the international land and maritime bor-
ders of the United States"). See Ted Robbins, Bush Signs Border Fence Act; Funds Not Found,
(Q&A: Building a Barrier Along the Border with MexicoApr 16, 2oo6), NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
Oct. 26, 2oo6, http://www.nppr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld+6388548.
61 See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, CBP BORDER PATROL OVERVIEW, available
at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border-security/borderpatrol/overview.xml (describing use of
electronic sensors, video monitoring, night vision scopes, as well as vehicle and air surveillance
capabilities).
62 The Minutemen describe themselves as citizens "doing the job Congress won't do."
Steve Lopez, Posse is Headed for the Wrong Roundup, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at B I. Among
their projects is "Operation Sovereignty," designed to "draw attention to illegal immigration
and border violence[, ... spotting undocumented immigrants and reporting them to authori-
ties." Mariana Castillo, Tempers Flare as Minutemen Take to Border, SAN-ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Sept. 12, 2oo6, at IB; see also The Minuteman Project, http://www.minutemanproject.
com/. State and local government officials, particularly in the border states, have also become
increasingly frustrated with federal action in this area. As a result, some states and municipali-
ties have become more active in making their own efforts to enforce the borders. In August
2005, the governors of New Mexico and Arizona declared "states of emergency" for various
regions in their states due to increases in unauthorized immigration. See N.M. Exec. Order
No. 2005-040 (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2oo5/au-
gust/o8I2o5_I.pdf; State of Ariz., Declaration of Emergency, Arizona-Mexico International
Border Security Emergency (Aug. 15 , 2005), available at http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/
DE-o8 1605-AZMEXBorderSecurity.pdf.
63 SeeJohnson, supra note Io, at 201-03 (discussing and refuting these common concerns
about open borders); P6coud & Guchteneire, supra note 1o (noting little empirical support for
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to the original idea of sovereignty and the nation's ability to protect and
preserve itself against external threats.
National security has been a focus of U.S. immigration law since the
Alien Act of 17 9 8 .
4 It is directly reflected in the law in various grounds of
inadmissibility and removability.65 The inadmissibility grounds exclude, in
broad language, noncitizens who: seek to engage or engage in espionage,
sabotage or "any other unlawful activity"; participate in, incite or otherwise
support terrorist activity or organizations; may cause "potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences;" have been or are members of the
Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; or participated in Nazi
persecution, genocide, torture or extrajudicial killing.66 The grounds for
removability, though somewhat narrower, are similar in many respects
and identical in others.67 Moreover, the immigration reform efforts of the
last decade-including both the 1996 changes in the law and the changes
since September 11, 2001-have often been motivated, at least in part, by
national security concerns and supported by such rhetoric.
68
Nonetheless, national security is not the only-or even necessarily the
primary-rationale for closed borders.69 Economic and cultural concerns are
claims that huge migration flows would result from a more open migration policy).
64 "An Act Respecting Alien Enemies," 6th Cong., 0798), available at http://www.yale.
eduilawweb/avalon/statutes/alien.htm) (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
65 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (2000) (national security related grounds of inadmis-
sibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (2000) (national security related grounds of deportability).
66 8 U.S.C. § 8 i 2(a)(3).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4) (listing security related grounds of deportability, including seek-
ing to engage or engaging in espionage, sabotage or "any other criminal activity which endan-
gers public safety or national security;" participating in, inciting or otherwise supporting ter-
rorist activity or organizations or receiving military-type training from a terrorist organization;
other activities that may cause potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences; or
participation in Nazi persecution, genocide, torture or extra-judicial killing or severe viola-
tions of religious freedom).
68 For example, both AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted in the wake of, and motivated
in part by, the 1994 Oklahoma City bombing and the original World Trade Center bombing
in 1993. See, e.g., AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 11O Stat. 1214 (1996) (enacted to "deter
terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other
purposes"). More recently, that has been particularly true of both the PATRIOT Act and
REAL ID. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 1 19 Stat. 231 (2005); Statement
of the Honorable Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Before
the United States Judiciary Committee, (Feb. z8, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/testimony/testimony1II72853501273.shtm ("First, and most important, immigration
reform should ensure that we maintain effective safeguards preventing terrorists from taking
advantage of our tradition of welcoming immigrants of all nations").
69 In fact, even some proponents of enforcement-based immigration reform have as-
serted that national security may be better served by more open immigration and cross-bor-
der collaboration. See Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff on Secure
Borders and Open Doors in the Information Age, (Jan. 17, zoo6), available at http://www.dhs.
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also paramount. Regular debate appears in the popular press and in academic
scholarship about the economic and cultural impact of immigration. 70 Fears
about the economic burden caused by immigrants or the economic impact
of immigration on citizens run through current immigration law: there are
economic-based grounds of inadmissibility and removability;7 immigrants
are prohibited from receiving most forms of public benefits and assistance;
72
and immigrant labor is permitted generally only when it will not have an
adverse impact on U.S. workers.73 Until fairly recently, cultural concerns
were also manifest in the immigration laws. Cultural concerns were often
mediated through the language of race-as in the Asian exclusion laws
or other limits that persisted until the 1950s. 74 Although less explicit in
the law today, apprehensions about cultural impact remain evident in
the numerical caps on immigration, including the per country limits that
gov/xnews/speeches/speech0266.shtm ("But as we continue to work to maintain our immi-
gration laws and to upgrade our security, our heritage, our national character, our economic
interests, even our national security interests, require us to continue to promote a welcoming
process for those who lawfully cross our borders to work, learn and visit").
70 See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions
Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Poliy, 4 IMMIGR. POIY IN Focus 6 (Aug. 2oo5), available
at http://www.ailf.org/ipc/infocus/zoo5fivemyths.pdf; Johnson, supra note 10, at 233-40 (eco-
nomic impact), 257-58 (cultural impact); see generally, Migration Information Source, U.S. in
Focus, http:/lwww.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/ (listing numerous articles on the impact
of immigration in the United States). Cf., Center for Immigration Studies, Costs ofImmigration,
http://www.cis.org/topies/costs.html (listing publications on costs of immigration).
71 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(4) (2000) (economic related grounds of inadmissibility); 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (economic related grounds of deportability).
72 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(5) (2000); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 1o4-193, 1iO Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in various
sections of 8 U.S.C.) (welfare reforms making immigrants, including permanent residents and
undocumented immigrants, ineligible for most forms of public assistance).
73 See INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000) (describing per country limits); 8 U.S.C. §1153(c)
(2ooo) (describing diversity visa lottery); 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(5) (describing labor certification
process that is intended to prevent displacement of U.S. workers and avoid adverse impact on
working conditions of U.S. workers).
74 See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look
at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279-88 (1996) (tracing the
history of the Asian exclusion laws through their formal removal in 1952 and lingering impact
until t965).
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serve to restrict immigration from the high demand countries of Central
America,75 and the structures of the "diversity" lottery.76
Grounded in the idea of sovereignty and the sovereign power to
exclude, this constellation of fears and concerns about immigration has
gradually dominated U.S. immigration law and policy. The focus has
become increasingly about putting limitations on immigration, and the
goal has become tightening or even closing the U.S. borders. However,
this is not necessarily an inevitable or even a wise policy, as is becoming
increasingly clear. Growing frustration with this failed policy of closure has
led to renewed calls for a more balanced approach to crafting immigration
policy.77  Fortunately, and interestingly, the same underpinning of
sovereignty under international law that has justified and reinforced the
closed border approach also presents the possibility of a radically different
approach that emphasizes loosening restrictions or opening the borders.
II. OPEN BORDERS: RIGHTS, RATIONALITY AND RESOURCES
Sovereignty in international law is, of course, fundamentally connected to
both territorial integrity and principles of national autonomy.78 However,
the international meaning and understanding of these ideas has evolved
since the 1880s and the era of the Chinese Exclusion Case. With the rise
of the modern human rights movement 79-and the challenges, and often
75 Section 202 of the INA sets per-country limits of 7%, with some exceptions for the to-
tal annual family-sponsored and employment-based immigration preference limits. 8 U.S.C.
§ I 152(a)(2). This results in a significant backlog in processing cases from high-demand coun-
tries, such as Mexico. The current U.S. State Department Visa Bulletin lists the wait times for
family-sponsored visas for Mexico ranging from approximately 6 to 19 years, depending on
category, and for employment-based visas ranging from current (immediately available) to 6
years, again depending on category. U.S. DEPT. ST. BULL. No. 104, Vol. VIII (Apr. 2007), avail-
able at http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/buletin/bulletin__3169.html.
76 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text; see also Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration, Equality, and Diversiy, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1993).
77 In the spring of 2oo6, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of immigrants and their
supporters took to the streets across the country to protest current U.S. immigration policy
and to express concerns about proposed legislation that would further "toughen" existing
laws. See, e.g., Yvonne Wingett & Daniel Gonzalez, Immigrants Protest in Valley, Cities Across
U.S., ARiz. REPUBLIC, Mar. z8, 2006, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/
news/articles/o327peoplemarch.html (estimating 20,000 protesters in Phoenix, half a million
in Los Angeles, and over IOO,OOO in Chicago); Maria Newman, Immigration Advocates Rally
Across U.S., N.Y. TMES, Apr. 1O, zoo6 (describing marches in New York City and elsewhere
across the country).
78 See supra notes 18-37 and accompanying text (describing contours of sovereignty in
international law).
79 International human rights law is essentially a modern, post-World War II phe-
nomenon. Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3-18 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed. 1999); CASSESE,
supra note 20, at 104.
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violence, of the end of colonialism and the break-up of the Soviet Union and
former Yugoslavia 8°-the dominance of sovereignty and territorial integrity
has eroded to accommodate the rights of both individuals and "peoples"
within and outside of states."1 These rights include individual and group
rights to self-determination,"2 freedom of movement, 3 and freedom
from discrimination. 84 An evolved understanding of sovereignty and its
relationship to individual human rights should inform, and transform, the
domestic view of immigration law in the United States. More open borders
would reflect a rational policy balance between protecting individual
rights and respecting sovereign powers to control territory and national
membership.
8o See generally Margaret Moore, The Territorial Dimension of Self-Determination, in
NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION 134-57 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (dis-
cussing claims of self-determination in the contexts of former Yugoslavia and in Quebec);
Michael McFaul, The Sovereignty Script, Red Book for Russian Revolutionaries, in PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 194 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
zoo) (describing aspects of the break-up of the Soviet Union).
81 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 104 (describing human rights as "competing-if not at
loggerheads-with the traditional principles of respect for the sovereign equality of States
and of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States"); see Louis Henkin, That "S"
Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. I, 3-4
(1999); see also Thomas Kleven, Why InternationalLaw Favors Emigration Over Immigration, 33
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 69, 7 1-72 (2002); Juss, supra note 19, at 321-22 ("sovereignty has
never been weaker").
82 Self-determination is expressed as a fundamental human right in both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1(1), Dec.
I9, 1966, 999 U.N.TS. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) available at http://www.ohchr.
org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 1(i), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm [hereinafter ICESCRI. It is also ar-
ticulated in the United Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 2 (entered into force, Oct.
24, 1945).
83 Rights of freedom of movement are provided in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the ICCPR. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13-15, G.A. Res. 217A
(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2007) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 12-13.
84 Principles of equality and non-discrimination are threaded throughout the major in-
ternational human rights documents. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2; ICESCR, supra
note 82, art. 2; Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 1-2.
Other human rights, such as the right to political participation and the right to work, are
also relevant to the relationship between sovereignty and national borders. See P6coud &
Guchteneire,supra note 1o, at 15-16. These rights are also reflected in the major international
human rights instruments discussed infra.
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A. International Law Support for Open Borders
Sovereignty continues to be a bedrock principle of international law; yet the
state-centric focus of sovereignty has now been balanced at the international
level by increased consideration of the individual.85 The development of
international human rights law has been most fundamental in shifting
the balance in this direction. 86 States are still the primary actors on the
international level-both in developing and in implementing international
law, including international human rights law.8 7 Furthermore, states are still
given tremendous latitude in how they arrange their domestic affairs and in
how they treat both their citizens and those subject to their jurisdiction and
control.88 However, sovereignty is not without limits, particularly when there
is a countervailing individual or group rights interest.89 Under international
85 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 104.
86 The protection of internationally recognized human rights has been a basic purpose of
the United Nations since its founding in 1945. U.N. Charter art. I para. 3 (entered into force,
Oct. 24, 1945). In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly established a Commission on Human
Rights, and in 1948 it adopted the Universal Declaration. The United Nations and its mem-
ber states have recently engaged in efforts to reform the U.N.'s existing human rights mecha-
nisms by creating a new Human Rights Council. See Warren Hoge, With Its Human Rights
Oversight Under Fire, U.N. Submits a Plan for a Strengthened Agency, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2oo6, at
A6 (describing plan for new Council).
87 There are international mechanisms to monitor States' compliance with international
human rights obligations-both "treaty bodies" such as the Human Rights Committee (creat-
ed to monitor compliance with the ICCPR) and non-treaty bodies such as the Human Rights
Commission (a subsidiary body of the United Nations to monitor general compliance with
international human rights obligations). However, these international mechanisms are gener-
ally considered to be avenues of last resort. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 41(c) (requiring
exhaustion of all available domestic remedies before the Committee will consider a matter);
see also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 247, 247-68 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed.
1999) (describing the primacy of national mechanisms in protecting human rights). There
is a presumption in favor of resolving problems at the national level-relying on national
governments to set up their domestic systems to protect human rights, provide remedies for
violations and generally implement international human rights obligations. The role of the
international mechanisms is primarily to establish and develop normative standards.
88 International human rights tribunals generally give some deference to national gov-
ernments in defining the content and scope of human rights protection domestically. This
is often referred to as the "margin of appreciation" doctrine. See, e.g., George Letsas, Two
Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 705 (2OO6) (discussing his-
tory and uses of the doctrine of margin of appreciation); Paul Mahoney, Marvelous Richness
of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism, 19 HuM. RTS. L. J. 1, 1-2 (1998) (discussing the
principle of subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation).
The common language of undertaking in human rights treaties requires a state party
to respect and ensure the rights of "all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction." See ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2(1); ICESCR, supra note 82, art. 2(1).
89 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 1o4-o8 (discussing the limits imposed on sovereignty by
principles of human rights and self-determination).
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law, states that have undertaken human rights obligations, either by treaty'
or under customary international law,91 have a responsibility to respect and
ensure those rights.9 International law operates primarily as a voluntary
"consent regime," however these obligations are binding on states once
they are undertaken.93 Although the United States is party to few of the
major international human rights treaties-namely, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment-it has
generally assumed a leadership role in seeking to advance protection of
human rights at the international level.94 The United States' leadership
90 The three major instruments of the "International Bill of Rights" are the Universal
Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR. See Universal Declaration, supra note 83; ICCPR,
supra note 82; and ICESCR, supra note 82. The Universal Declaration is not a binding treaty,
but some scholars believe it has achieved the status of binding customary international law.
See, e.g., Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. I, 16-17, 20 (1982). The Covenants are both binding treaties; and the
United States is party to the ICCPR, among others.
91 Customary international law is also binding on states. See RESTATEMENT (IhIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) (identifying sources of inter-
national law, including customary international law). In the context of international human
rights, there is a limited set of rights violations that constitute violations of customary inter-
national law. See id. § 702.
92 For example, the general language of obligation in the ICCPR provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2(1).
93 See supra notes 9o-9I (discussing the language of general undertaking). See
also Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners' Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 31-33 (Stephen
D. Krasner ed., 2001) (describing these international commitments as the exercise of sover-
eignty, rather than limitations upon sovereignty); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 1o6 YALE L.J. 2599,2645-46 (1997) (discussing the theory that internalized
compliance and obedience increase comportment with international law). Koh identifies the
process as Transnational Legal Process (TLP), which "promotes the interaction, interpreta-
tion, and internalization of international legal norms." Id. at 2603. Koh distinguishes social,
political, and legal internalization of norms, including explicit and implicit judicial internaliza-
tion. Id. at 2656-57. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks also discuss coercion, persuasion, and
acculturation as methods for ensuring compliance with international human rights law. Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights
Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 6z, 623 (2004).
94 The United States and the other victorious allied nations played a foundational role
in the development of both the substantive components of international human rights law
and the international monitoring mechanisms. See JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE, 31-33, 42-43 (1984); John P. Humphrey, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character in HUMAN
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role has not, however, translated into increased protection of human rights
in the context of domestic immigration law.
In the context of immigration and border control, many internationally-
recognized human rights are implicated, including the rights to self-
determination, freedom of movement, and freedom from discrimination. 95
However, in light of the close linkage between sovereignty and border
control, this connection to human rights is seldom raised or discussed in the
context of national policy discourse. 6 The contours and nuances of each
of these rights would merit a fuller discussion than this article will provide;
however, a summary review is sufficient to illustrate their transformative
potential to radically rebalance U.S. immigration law and policy.97
The right to self-determination is both fundamental and deeply
contested as a matter of international law. On the one hand, it has
underpinned the idea of national independence and sovereignty since
the days of the American and French Revolutions.98 Over time, self-
RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21-37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
The U.S. became a party to the ICCPR in 1992 and to the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1994; the U.S. has asserted
various reservations to both treaties. U.S. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations,
ICCPR, 138 CONG. REC. S8o68 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (U.S. adherence effective Sept. 8,
1992); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 136 CONG. REC. S36192-36194 (1990) (U.S. adherence effective Nov. 20, 1994).
95 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 627 (2006) ("Because they are predicated on one's status as a human
being, rather than on one's affiliation with any particular nation-state, international human
rights are both most relevant to, and most tested by, the treatment of foreign nationals"). But
see Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363-64 (999) (identifying the potential limitations of a human
rights approach to immigration matters).
96 There has been more discussion in legal scholarship, however. See, e.g., Ahcene
Boulesbaa, A Comparative Study Between the International Law and the United States Supreme
Court Standards for Equal and Human Rights in the Treatment of Aliens, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 445
(1990); David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 627 (2006); Joan Fitzpatrick & William Mckay Bennett, A Lion in the
Path? The Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 589 (1995); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A
Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075 (1996); James A.R.
Nafziger, The General Admission ofAliens Under International Law, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 804 (983);
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999).
97 This article does not address or consider the many complex and interesting issues
related to the incorporation of international law into the domestic legal system nor the many
possible uses of international law in the domestic context. Instead, it limits itself to suggest-
ing that meaningful consideration of the principles, policy goals, and theoretical develop-
ments reflected in international human rights law would advance the development of domes-
tic immigration law.
98 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 1O5 (tracing the history from the French Revolution); Daniel
Philpott, Self-Determination in Practice, in NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION
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determination-the idea of the consent of the governed in any sovereign
state-has become the standard for judging the legitimacy of the exercise of
sovereign power." The two major human rights treaties-the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)-address the
right of self-determination in expansive terms and in a place of primacy.1°
In identical language, both Article 1 of the ICESCR and Article 1 of the
ICCPR state, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development."'101 Although the right of
self-determination serves in part to justify sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of states, it is also constrained by those ideas. I02 Nonetheless, when
the right of self-determination is exercised as the right of a "people," rather
than an existing nation, there is the potential to disrupt the sovereignty of
an existing nation-state.103
8o (Margaret Moore ed., 1998) (noting the origins of self-determination in the American
Revolution, colonial independence movements and the theories of liberal democracy).
99 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 105-07. Self-determination "requires a free and genu-
ine expression of the will of the peoples concerned." Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion,
1975 I.C.J. 12, 32, 33 (Oct. 16). See also HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, T-IE
BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 151 (2000) (noting that "a sovereign
state is in theory built on the self-determination of its population in the sense that the people
should determine the way that government is organised").
ioo This linkage of the right to self-determination to the entire spectrum of rights re-
flected in the two Covenants underscores its importance in international law. CHARLESWORTH
& CHINKIN, supra note 99, at 152.
10I ICCPR, supra note 82, art. i(i); ICESCR, supra note 82, art. i(i). The remainder of
shared Article 1 reads:
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of
its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determina-
tion, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Id. The United Nations Charter also refers to respect for self-determination as one of its
purposes. Article I of the Charter states that "[tihe Purposes of the United Nations are:... To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measure to strengthen peace."
U. N. Charter art. I, para. 2 (entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945).
102 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at io6-o8; Philpott, supra note 98, at 86 ("[s]elf-determina-
tion has long lingered in the shadow of state sovereignty").
103 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at io6-107. This was dramatically illustrated with the break-
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Thus, the right of self-determination is usually least controversial when
it is exercised as an individual right, within the confines of an existing nation-
state. 1°4 However, even when the right of self-determination is exercised
as an individual right, it has the potential to have a significant impact on
national sovereignty if the individual seeks to pursue his or her political
rights or economic, social and cultural development in a nation other than
the one of his or her citizenship.105 Typically, the exercise of individual
human rights is not limited to the country of one's citizenship; in fact, a
state has the obligation to protect to the human rights of those "subject to
its jurisdiction," not just its citizens. 106 In this view, the recognition of the
right to self-determination has not stopped, and arguably should not stop,
at national borders.
The principles underlying the rights to freedom of movement and
freedom from discrimination have similar transformative potential. The
right to freedom of movement and important related rights are articulated
in the major international human rights instruments. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights"°7 includes the right to "freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each State" and the right to "leave
up of former Yugoslavia, for example. See, e.g., Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and
the Final Status of Kosovo, 8o Ci.-KENT L. REV. 235 (2005); Philpott, supra note 98, at 79.
104 CASSESE, supra note 2o, at 1o7; see Paul R. Williams & Fancesca Jannotti Pecci,
Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 347, 352-53 (2004) (distinguishing "sovereignty first" and "self-determination first"
models of self-determination); see also Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992), article 8(4) (clarifying that "[niothing in the present
Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political
independence of States").
105 See Francis Gabor & John B. Rosenquest, IV, The Unsettled Status of Economic Refugees
from the American and International Legal Perspectives-A Proposalfor Recognition under Existing
International Law, 41 TEx. INT'L L.J. 275 (2oo6) (proposing individual self-determination as a
support for recognition of freedom of movement).
io6 See supra note oo (noting that the common language of obligation in human rights
treaties requires a State Party to respect and ensure the rights of "all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction"). See ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 2(l) ("Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant .... );
cf ICESCR, supra note 82, art. z() ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all ap-
propriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures").
107 The Universal Declaration is a consensus declaration of the United Nations General
Assembly; it is not a binding treaty. However, some scholars believe that it has attained the
status of binding customary international law. See supra note 83.
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any country, including [one's] own, and to return."'' 8 It also recognizes
the right to a nationality' °9 and to seek asylum from persecution."10 These
rights are also recognized in more limited form in the ICCPR as the right
to "liberty of movement" and to choose a residence when one is already
lawfully within a territory."' The cautious framing of these rights and the
limitations upon them reflect the tension between respect for sovereignty
and for individual rights-and the continuing dominance of sovereignty
in the area of immigration."' Although international human rights law has
not explicitly recognized complete freedom of movement across national
borders or a right to the citizenship of one's choosing, the law may be
moving in that direction." 3 When freedom of movement is considered
together with the right to individual self-determination and freedom
from discrimination, it arguably should. Full recognition of the right to
free movement in this manner would similarly require a fundamental
reconsideration of U.S. immigration law and its static notion of sovereignty
and the power to exclude.
io8 Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 13.
io9 Id. at art. 15.
i Io Id. at art. 14. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration also states "[tihis right may not
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Id. This right has been
specifically recognized in the U.S. immigration law provisions regarding asylum. See, e.g., INA,
8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2007) (asylum procedure); 8 U.S.C. § 1 158 (zooo) (definition of refugee); 8
U.S.C. § i oi(a)(42) (2ooo).
i i i Article 12 provides:
i. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country.
ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 12. Article 13 addresses the rights of noncitizens in case of expulsion
when lawfully present in a country other than the country of citizenship. Id. at art. 13.
112 They also reflect the views of sovereignty contemporaneous to their adoption-i 948
for the Universal Declaration and the 1966 for the ICCPR. Universal Declaration, supra note
83; ICCPR, supra note 82.
113 There is an asymmetry in the current understanding of the right to freedom of move-
ment: there is full recognition of a right to emigrate, or leave one's country, and only limited
recognition of a right to immigration, to enter another country. SeeJuss, supra note 19, at 289;
Kleven, supra note 81, at 69. Butsee Pdcoud & Guchteneire, supra note 1o..
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In the context of nondiscrimination, the balance between sovereignty
and individual rights shifts more dramatically in the direction of protection
of human rights. The right to be free from discrimination is stated in
expansive terms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR
and the ICESCR. 1 4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims
in its first article that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights.""'  It expands upon that general principle by clarifying that
discrimination on a broad array of grounds is not permitted. "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
1 1 6
The major human rights Covenants include identical language." 7 This
principle of nondiscrimination is also incorporated in the major regional
human rights treaties," 8 and two particular forms of discrimination-racial
discrimination and discrimination against women-are the subjects of
separate international conventions."9 Although citizenship status is not
114 Collectively, these documents are often referred to as the International Bill of Rights.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.
i), The International Bill of Rights (June 1996), available at http://vxvw.unhchr.ch/html/
menu6/2/fs2.htn (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
115 Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. i.
I16 Id. at art. 2.
117 Article 2 of the ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to the present Covenant un-
dertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICESCR, supra note 82, art.
2. Article 2 of the ICCPR states, "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory.., the rights recognized in the pres-
ent Covenant, without distinction of any kind..." ICCPR,supra note 82, art. 2. Seesupra note
85 (discussing similar provisions in the U.N. Charter).
118 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982) (prohibiting distinction based on "race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, po-
litical or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status"); American
Convention on Human Rights art. i, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.TS. 123 (prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition"); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Apr. 11, 1950, C.E.TS.
005 available at http://conventions.coe.int[Treaty/en/rreaties/Html/oo5.htm (prohibiting dis-
crimination on "any ground, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status"); see also Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam art. 1(a), Aug. 5, 199o, O.I.C.
Res. No. 49/1 9 -P (1990) available at http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam199
o .
htm (stating that "[aill men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations
and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex,
or other considerations").
119 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
G.A. Res. 21o6 (XX) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), ratified by the United States (en-
tered into force Nov. 20, 1994); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
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specifically mentioned, discrimination based on race, color, national or social
origin is explicitly prohibited. 2 ° Such discrimination often overlaps or is
conflated with discrimination against immigrants."' In addition, much of
the general treaty language prohibits discrimination on undefined "other"
grounds as well."' Despite this comprehensive ban on discrimination
based on individual characteristics, differential treatment of citizens
and noncitizens has largely been accepted without examination based
on an expansive view of sovereignty.1 13 However, the equally expansive
prohibition on discrimination that is recognized in international law-a
prohibition that continues to expand to include new categories-offers
the potential to challenge this additional form of discrimination based on
citizenship.2 4 At a minimum, the global commitment to equal treatment
requires closer, and ongoing, scrutiny of the distinctions that are made
between citizens and noncitizens.
While still farfrom displacingthe dominance of sovereignty, the principles
of self-determination, freedom of movement and nondiscrimination
have started to constrain unfettered notions of sovereignty as a matter of
international human rights law. This evolved understanding of sovereignty
and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55 (adopted by UN General
Assembly on Nov. 25, 1981); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.
htm (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), not ratified by the United States.
zo See supra notes 114-17 (providing exemplar treaty language prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on race, color, national or social origin).
ii The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the treaty body
charged with monitoring compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, has recognized this connection. In 2004, the Committee ad-
opted General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against Non-citizens. Gen. Rec. 30,
Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc. I i/rev.3 (Comm. on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://www.ohehr.org/english/bodies/
cerd/docslCERD-GC3o.doc. Although the General Recommendation acknowledges that
the Convention "provides for the possibility of differentiating between citizens and non-citi-
zens," it calls on States to avoid using that provision to undermine the general prohibition on
discrimination. Id. at '[' 1-2.
122 See supra notes 1 16-22 and accompanying text (prohibitions of discrimination on
"other status" or "other social condition").
123 A notable exception to this treatment is the prohibition of discrimination within the
European Union. Article 12 of the European Community Treaty prohibits discrimination
based on nationality (rather than citizenship, as all nationals of Member States are also citizens
of the Union). Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related art. 12, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C 340) 3 available at http:/eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/il997D/htm/1I997D.html
[hereinafter EC Treaty]; see infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text; seealso NICOLA ROGERS
& RICK SCANNELL, FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 195-99
(2005) (discussing principle of nondiscrimination in the context of the European Union).
124 See Johnson, supra note iO, at 215-21 (discussing the racism apparent in current U.S.
immigration law and policy).
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and its relationship to human rights could-and should-inform the
domestic view of immigration law in the United States, particularly because
of the important role of sovereignty in shaping that law and the domestic
history of expanding rights protection in other areas."2 5 However, this
more nuanced understanding of sovereignty has largely been absent from
policy debates and legal reform efforts in the United States. While few
policymakers advocate completely closed borders or a complete absence
of rights for immigrants or noncitizens, the dominant view expressed has
focused on increased restrictions on immigration. There are strong, but
infrequently articulated, arguments for moving in the opposite direction
of current U.S. policy-away from increasing closure of the borders and
towards open borders-all of which are compatible with a more balanced
recognition of both sovereignty and rights.
B. Opening the Borders in U.S. Immigration Law
It is not inevitable, and surely not desirable, that U.S. immigration law and
policy continue to reflect the sweeping view of sovereignty postulated
over a century ago without consideration of the benefits and opportunities
offered by increased rights protection and more open borders. As an initial
matter, there is the vcry practical argument that the policies of "closure"
have fundamentally failed to address the primary concerns that justify
them, and in fact, the likelihood that such policies have been counter-
productive.2 16 In fact, more open borders may offer the potential for both
short-term and long-term national security, economic and cultural benefits
domestically and globally. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the
emphasis on closed borders is inconsistent with many U.S. national and
cultural values that embrace individual and group rights, including the
rights to self-determination, free movement and nondiscrimination.
2 7
125 See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants'Rights, 37 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 643 (2OO6); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman, Advancing Civil Rights
Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'V
131, 132-34 (2003); see also Robert Pear & Michael Luo, Senate Votes, 64-31, to Retain Temporary
Worker Program in Immigration Measure, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 20.
126 The sense that current policies have failed to address policy goals spans the political
spectrum. Compare, e.g., Massey, supra note 70, at I, with ROB SOBH~AI, UNITED? STATES, OUR
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (July 9, 2002), http://www.nationalreview.
com/comment/comment-sobhanio7o9o2.asp. See also Robert Pear, Many Employers See Flaws
as Immigration Bill Evolves, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2007, at 123 (quoting Mr. E. John Krumholtz,
director of federal affairs at Microsoft, on the proposed immigration reform bill, "'[tihe deal is
worse than the status quo, and the status quo is a disaster").
127 Many of these values are reflected in the U.S. Bill of Rights and civil rights legisla-
tion. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (rights to life, liberty, due process and equal protection); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2ooo) (creating a cause of action
for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution"). They
are also reflected in the U.S. ratification of the ICCPR. See supra note 91. See also Johnson,
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Given the long historical development and many complexities of
U.S. immigration law, it is difficult to envision what a shift towards open
borders would look like in detail. 1 8 At the outermost end of the spectrum,
we could imagine a national border comparable to the internal U.S. state
borders, devoid of any controls or limits on entry and exit.12 9 Such a policy
could eliminate any numerical caps, restrictive categories, or grounds for
exclusion. 30 It could dismantle the large and complex administrative
and legislative regime set up to deal with both immigration benefits and
enforcement. 3' However, the policy would not have to go so far, and
arguably, such an extreme shift would simply risk repeating the policy
imbalance in the opposite direction and ignore valid concerns that support
some restrictions or limitations.13 2 Is it possible, then, to advance individual
supra note io, at 244-58 (discussing incompatibility of immigration enforcement with national
values).
1z8 Kleven suggests "substantial, though not unrestricted, freedom of movement in
both the emigration and immigration contexts, subject however to a balancing process that
would also give substantial weight to the interests of others affected thereby and of society
as a whole[,]" would satisfy liberal ideals. Kleven, supra note 81, at 83. See also P6coud &
Guchteneire, supra note 1o, at 1.
129 In proposing recognition of a right to free movement as early as i971, Nett identified
the United States as a model of an "open system of world migration:"
Do we have any knowledge of how an open system of world migration
might work? We have limited cases. One might think of free move-
ment of people within the British system. A clearer example, however,
is within the United States of America, where people have, and have
had, the right of free movement since slavery was abolished more than
a century ago. Here we have a fair-sized experiment to see how free
movement operates in one instance. It works surprisingly well on one
subcontinent anyway. When there is a drought in one region, as in the
dust-bowl days of the 1930s, people move to another region, and oppor-
tunities are somewhat equalized. When clumsy state officials or dema-
gogues disrupt a school system, teachers move to another state. This has
a corrective effect on state policies or, if it does not, enriches the states
which have better policies or more to offer. Imagine what it would be
like if everybody were kept within the boundaries of his own state, and
you have a fair picture of most of the rest of the world today!
Nett, supra note 2, at 219-20. Other models include some of the regional approaches to free
migration. See P(coud & Guchteneire, supra note 1o, at 20-22 (describing the European
Union and other regional examples).
130 See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text (describing existing limitations).
131 A freer system of migration would not eliminate, of course, the responsibility of mi-
grants to obey local laws; rather, as Nett argues, it would make it easier for them to do so. Nett,
supra note 2, at 220. For an argument in support of retaining some border controls in the
European Union context, see J.P.H. Donner, Abolition of Border Controls, in FREE MOvEMENT OF
PERSONS IN EUROPE 5, 6-8 (Henry G. Schermers et al., eds. 1993).
132 The risks would be particularly high if the U.S. undertook such measures unilaterally
without considering the impact on neighboring countries and regional impact. See, e.g., Nett,
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rights and still account for concerns about national security and economic
and cultural impact?
Perhaps a better and more easily conceivable model is that provided by
the European Union.133 Although there are many aspects of the European
Union system that are unique and may only be appropriate to that system,
it offers a tantalizing example in several respects. First, individuals living
within the system are considered citizens of both their own nation-states
and of the European Union. 34 This model presents a new and more open
conception of citizenship, a dual citizenship, including both a national
citizenship and a regional or supranational citizenship.135 Broader citizenship
would extend the relationship beyond individual and nation to encompass
other nations and their citizens as well. Second, an important feature of the
European Union system is the freedom of movement permitted within that
system.'36 In fact, that freedom of movement-to work, to live, to travel-
is characterized as an essential aspect of the system.'37 Although there are
supra note 2, at 221-23 (noting potential problems of "brain-drain," short-term instability, and
concerns about national security, employment and cultural compatibility).
133 The European Union began with six Member States in 1950, with the creation of
the European Coal and Steel Community. ROGERS & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 3-1 o (de-
scribing the four founding Treaties of the European Union and the subsequent amending
treaties). The European Union has since expanded to 25 Member States. Id. at 3. It has its
own decision-making institutions and law, including human rights law, but also works in the
broader framework of regional human rights law. Id. at o-i 7 (describing the main institutions
of the European Union), 35-44 (describing relationship between EU law and the European
Convention on Human Rights).
134 Article 17 of the European Community Treaty provides, "Citizenship of the Union is
hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a member State shall be a citizen
of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizen-
ship." EC Treaty, supra note 123, art 17(1) See RoGERs & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 45
("The uniqueness and potential enormity of these provisions-based on the creation of the
novel concept of citizenship of a supranational body-should be acknowledged").
135 Id. at 45. Scholars have also proposed various models of "global citizenship." See
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol & Matthew Hawk, Traveling the Boundaries of Statelessness:
Global Passports and Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 97 (2005); Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereignty, Security and Soul, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1009, 1023-35
(2005); B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making,
15 EUR. J. INT'L L. I, 33 (2004); Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nationality and the Postnational
Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 979, 1000-03 (zoo2).
136 Article 18 of the European Community Treaty sets forth this central right, "[elvery
citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the
measures adopted to give it effect." EC Treaty, supra note 123, art. 18(I).
137 ROGERS & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 77-78 (describing the gradual extension of
free movement rights within the EU and suggesting that "any EU citizen should have the
right to move and reside in the territory of another Member State simply by virtue of being a
Union citizen"). The European Court of Justice has used principles of human rights to infer
a right of residence even when not directly conferred by the EC Treaty and secondary legisla-
tion. See Case C-6o/oo, Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6279,
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requirements and some limitations attached to the free movement, it is
fundamentally conceived as a freedom to move across borders. 138  Finally,
the laws regarding movement and migration in the particular nation-states
of the European Union and within the European Union system exist also
within the framework of supranational human rights law, particularly the
regional European human rights system. 39 The human rights law of the
European Union and of the European Convention on Human Rights
provide context for the development of migration in the region."4° Thus,
the European Union system reflects a model of migration and borders that
balances national sovereignty with individual rights protection within a
framework of regional, if not global, cooperation.14 '
Short of adopting such a regional model, however, or taking steps in the
progression to that end, at a minimum, the shift to open borders should
include a reexamination of the basic aspects of U.S. immigration law and
policy in light of the countervailing rights at stake. Using individual self-
determination, freedom of movement and non-discrimination as guiding
principles, an open borders approach would mean raising, eliminating or
adjusting the numerical caps to more accurately reflect demand; it would
also suggest eliminating the specific immigrant categories or adding an
unrestricted category of open immigration. 4 ' It would require a reversal
of the trend towards adding and expanding the grounds of exclusion and
removal. 143  Finally, it would mean rationalizing the process by shifting
the presumptions away from exclusion and towards inclusion, as well as
shifting resources away from enforcement efforts and towards the provision
of immigration services.
Such'a shift in perspective, in this case on who may enter the country, is
not completely unprecedented in U.S. immigration law; it occurred in the
'146; Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R.
1-7091,11 80-94; ROGERS & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 168-69.
138 EC Treaty, supra note 123, art. 18(1); ROGERS & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 77-78
(discussing scope of the freedom of movement).
139 ROGERS & SCANNELL, supra note 123, at 37-38, 40, 42-44 (describing relationship
between the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights).
140 Id.
141 Thomas C. Heller & Abraham D. Sofaer, Sovereignty, The Practitioners' Perspective, in
PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 35-37 (Stephen
D. Krasner, ed., 2001) (describing the evolved model of sovereignty reflected in the European
Union system). See supra note 135 (discussing theories of "global citizenship").
142 See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text (describing existing caps and catego-
ries and problems of limitations and backlogs).
143 See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text (describing grounds for exclusion
and removal). By far, the most expansive and frequently used category is the crime-related
grounds, particularly the subsection permitting removal based on conviction for an "aggra-
vated felony." DOUGHERTY ET AL, supra note 55, at 5 (stating that 43 percent of removals in
2005 were based on crime-related grounds); see also 8 U.S.C. § 122 7 (a)(2)(A)(iii) (2000) (a non-
citizen "convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable").
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converse area of who may leave-the relinquishment of citizenship. In the
early days of the nation, at common law, an individual could not renounce
his or her citizenship without the consent of the sovereign.'" The powers
both to bestow and to release from citizenship were considered sovereign
powers. 14  However, in the later 1800s, the United States began entering
into reciprocal treaties with other countries, recognizing an individual
right to renounce citizenship upon naturalization in a foreign country.'
46
Denationalization-the deprivation of nationality by unilateral fiat of the
state-has been increasingly disfavored in both international and domestic
law.'47 For the most part, the law now requires the consent of the individual,
rather than the sovereign, to relinquish citizenship. 148 Full recognition of
individual rights to self-determination, freedom of movement, and freedom
from discrimination would require a similar shift in allocating the power to
confer citizenship."'
The reasons to consider such a shift are evident. As a practical matter,
the limitations on immigration and efforts at enforcement discussed
above have failed to resolve the primary concerns that motivated them.5'
144 See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 246 (1830) ("The general doctrine is, that no
persons can by any act of their own, without the consent of the government, put off their al-
legiance, and become aliens"); see alo BROWNLIE, supra note 18, at 385-424.
145 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,604-05 (1889)
(listing a range of "sovereign" powers, including the power to "admit subjects of other na-
tions to citizenship"); Shanks, 28 U.S. at 246 (stating the general rule that a person cannot
renounce citizenship without the consent of the government); see also BROWNLIE, supra note
18, at 385-424.
146 These agreements were known as "Bancroft Treaties." See Charles Gordon, The
Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-23
(1965) (describing historical development); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning
of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1428 0997) (discussing the context of the history of dual
nationality).
147 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253, 262 (1967) (acknowledging constitutional right to remain a citizen unless one voluntarily
relinquishes); see also Universal Declaration, supra note 83, art. 15.
148 Naturalized U.S. citizens are treated differently in this respect than U.S.-born citi-
zens. Both are subject to expatriation, which is typically the voluntary relinquishment of
citizenship. INA, 8 U.S.C. § 148 1(a) (2007) (focusing on voluntary actions of citizens by birth
or naturalization). However, only naturalized citizens are subject to denaturalization. Id. §
1451 (stating various bases for revoking naturalization).
149 Even with more expansive ways to assume citizenship, there would likely still be
a process to pursue and perhaps even certain criteria to satisfy. However, the presumption
of availability would shift, and it would be more broadly available for those who choose it.
Despite the current political climate, recent polls suggest that most Americans favor immigra-
tion reforms that would allow a path to citizenship for immigrants, even those who are in the
country without authorization. SeeThe New York Times-CBS News Poll, Question 17, March
7-11, 2007, at 14, available at http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/2007o313 _
pollresults.pdf; Gallup Poll, Immigration at 1-2, 2007, available at http://www.galluppoll.com/
content/default.aspx?ci= i66o.
15o See Johnson, supra note io, at 245-52 (discussing the problems of enforcement that
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Over the past decade, and particularly since September 11, 2001, the
immigration laws have become more and more strict, the bureaucracy
has been dramatically expanded and additional resources have been
devoted to enforcement."' 1 However, the public perception, and likely the
reality, is that the "problem" of immigration-particularly unauthorized
immigration-has only increased.' In fact, it appears that the policies of
closure may have been counter-productive in several respects. Those who
enter the U.S. without authorization are more likely to stay in the U.S. to
avoid the risks of subsequent border crossings. I"3 The less the laws reflect
a fair balance of policy, the more likely they are to encourage disrespect for
the law. I"4 Perhaps most troubling, excessive enforcement efforts divert
resources to marginal problems that could be used more efficiently for
problems of serious concern, such as economic development and prevention
of terrorism.
5 -5
In addition, more open borders offer the potential for both short-term
and long-term benefits to the United States and on a larger global scale.
A policy that is geared solely towards closure misses the opportunities
offered by immigration. 5 6 Undoubtedly the U.S. benefits from immigrant
have arisen); Juss, supra note 19, at 309-1 I (discussing practical difficulties in restricting mi-
gration); Pdcoud & Guchteneire, supra note io, at 4-5 (noting the consensus among experts
that "tougher measures of migration control do not reach their proclaimed goal").
151 Seesupra note 57 (noting that the proposed budget for Customs and Border Protection
for FY 2007 is approximately $8 billion and addressing the expanding numbers of personnel
and scope of enforcement actions). See generally 2005 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
supra note 44.
152 Although most Americans favor providing a path to citizenship for immigrants, con-
cerns about the rates of unauthorized immigration remain high. See The New York Times-
CBS News Poll, supra note 149, at 14, Questions 16-i 7; see also Gallup Poll, supra note 149.
153 See P6coud & Guchteneire, supra note Io, at 13-14.
154 See, e.g., Juss, supra note 19, at 31 i-I 2 (describing the counter-intuitive effect of "get
tough' asylum policies" in Europe that ended up increasing "'irregular migration'... 'in defi-
ance of national laws or regulations').
155 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Immigration Enforcement:
the Rhetoric, the Reality, available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/i78/ (last visited
Oct. 13, 2007) (TRAC report based on analysis of records from the Immigration Courts and the
Justice Department finds that only a "tiny fraction" of all Department of Homeland Security
actions regarding immigration involve terrorism despite claims that this issue is a high prior-
ity mission of the DHS; instead, the overwhelming majority of actions involve immigration
charges, primarily violations based on entering the U.S. without inspection); see also Johnson,
supra note I o, at 26o-62 (discussing the opportunities to focus on issues such as national secu-
rity in an open border regime); Nett, supra note 2, at 225 (discussing "social waste" caused by
diverting excessive resources to border control); Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics
ofImmigration Poliy, 5 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 271, 276-84 (2003) (discussing economic benefits
of immigration).
156 Those benefits may be both tangible and intangible. Nett, supra note z, at 225 (not-
ing advantages such as "remov[ing] the unrealistic ideas that people have about others,"
ameliorating some of the negative effects of nationalism, eliminating the "social waste" that
derives from "situational inopportunity" and from excessive costs of enforcing borders).
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labor-both skilled and unskilled.'57 An open border will promote more
efficient allocation and use of labor and other economic resources, not just
domestically, but also regionally and perhaps globally."5 ' In addition to
economic benefits, there are also cultural benefits to diversity, increased
family unification, and the respect for individual rights reflected in an open
immigration policy.15 9 Finally, and importantly, the emphasis on closed
borders is inconsistent with many U.S. national and cultural values, including
nondiscrimination, diversity, tolerance, individuality, self-determination,
freedom of movement and association, and other rights protection.'W
CONCLUSION
A call to consider "open borders" may seem utopian or even naive at this
stage of U.S. immigration policy development and in the context of the
current political climate. At the end of my immigration course, I repeat
the survey of where students place themselves on the policy spectrum, and
often those who voted initially for open borders have moved themselves
away from that position to another spot on the continuum. Interestingly,
while we have typically lost the advocates for open borders, there has not
yet been an increase in advocates for closed borders. Perhaps as their
understanding of the complexities of the system and the competing policy
goals increases, students are reluctant to stake out an inflexible position at
one end of the spectrum. However, U.S. immigration policy is currently
doing just that-staking out an inflexible position at the "closed borders"
end of the spectrum.
It is time to consider seriously the thoughtful and persuasive arguments
that support rebalancing U.S. immigration policy by moving in the opposite
direction, towards open borders. Many of these arguments are grounded
in the same principles of international law that originally supported an
absolute power to exclude inherent in a national sovereign and that have
157 For an overview of the research on the impact of immigration on the economy, see
Immigrants and the U.S. Economy Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the S. Judiciary Comm,
Io7th Cong. 16-38 (oo i) (statement of Stephen Moore, Senior Fellow in Economics, Cato
Institute). For an overview on labor of unauthorized immigrants, see Jeffrey S. Passel, The Size
and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S., Research Report, Pew
Hispanic Center (March 7, zoo6) at 9-13, available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/6i.
pdf;see also Ernesto Zedillo,Migranomics Instead of Walls, FORBES,Jan. 8, 2007, at 25 (regarding
importance of immigrant labor to the economy).
158 See Juss, supra note 19, at 315-16 (discussing the "positive long-term effects of freer
migration"); P6coud & Guchteneire, supra note io, at 9-13 (summarizing the positive eco-
nomic aspects of freer migration); Trebilcock, supra note 155, at 275-96 (discussing economic
impact and perspectives on immigration).
159 These values are identified as policy goals in existing immigration policy. See supra
note 45 and accompanying text (discussing family-sponsored, employment-based and diver-
sity immigration).
i6o See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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now evolved to recognize the importance of individual human rights. The
policies of "closure" have failed, and an unthinking adherence to them, or
expansion of them, will only offer more of the same. An overemphasis on
closure and enforcement ignores the potential opportunities and benefits
of open immigration, in both the short-term and long-term and both
domestically and globally. Ultimately, such policies disregard and even
undermine core U.S. national and cultural values.
As Congress considers, once again, legislation to reform U.S. immigration
law, it is time to move beyond the unbalanced focus on limited guest
worker programs and increased border enforcement. A new immigration
policy should be grounded in principles of international law that balance
respect for sovereignty with recognition of individual human rights; a more
imaginative and effective immigration policy must reflect meaningful
consideration of the merits of open borders.

